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lundi 2 avril 2018

Skripal : la Russie adresse 13 questions à l'Organisation pour l'interdiction des armes chimiques

Dans une lettre rendue publique le 1er avril par le ministère russe des Affaires étrangères, Moscou dresse une liste de 13 questions à l'adresse de l'Organisation pour l'interdiction des armes chimiques (OIAC), au sujet de l'empoisonnement sur le sol britannique de l'ancien agent double russe Sergueï Skripal et sa fille. Sur son site, le ministère russe réaffirme en outre que l'affaire, qui envenime les relations entre Moscou et l'Occident, a été «fabriquée contre la Russie».

On April 1, the Permanent Representation of the Russian Federation to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) sent the following questions regarding the fabricated “Skripal case” to the OPCW’s Technical Secretariat:

1. What kind of assistance has London requested from the OPCW’s Technical Secretariat?

2. Will the OPCW’s Technical Secretariat, acting in accordance with the established procedure, share information with the Executive Council, including Russia, which the UK will provide to the OPCW’s Technical Secretariat as per Clause 38 (е) of Article VIII of the Chemical Weapons Convention, which stipulates the provision of “technical evaluation to States Parties in the implementation of the provisions of this Convention, including evaluation of scheduled and unscheduled chemicals”?

3. Has the UK party provided the OPCW’s Technical Secretariat with the current, medical, legal or any other additional information regarding the British inquiry?

4. What exactly would the British like the OPCW’s Technical Secretariat to confirm: the fact of the use of a nerve gas, or that it was a type of nerve agent known as Novichok according to the Western classification?

5. What kind of data and material evidence have the British provided to the OPCW’s Technical Secretariat (samples, the results of analysis of these samples, any other evidence)?

6. Who headed the OPCW group of experts who visited Britain? What specialists formed the group? How long did they work? With whom did they interact?

7. What procedure was used to collect samples? Was this carried out in compliance with the fundamental principle stipulated for OPCW investigations, that is, the “chain of custody”?

8. Which certified laboratories will analyse the samples which the OPCW’s Technical Secretariat received during the visit of its experts to Britain?

9. How much time does the OPCW’s Technical Secretariat need to reach a conclusion?

10. Has the OPCW’s Technical Secretariat approved the disclosure of the investigative material by the UK to the EU countries (according to available information, France has become fully involved in the investigation)?

11. Has France notified the OPCW’s Technical Secretariat of its involvement in the technical assistance as requested by the UK?

12. Has France provided its material on the investigation, if any, to the OPCW’s Technical Secretariat?

13. Can the OPCW’s Technical Secretariat provide the French investigative material, if any, to Russia for perusal? If not, why?